



Caricaturing “traitors”: Communal reactions to indigenous collaboration in Japanese-occupied Korea

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Abstract

Under foreign rule, indigenous collaborators pose a serious challenge that betrays the trust and faith of their compatriots with whom they have long shared experiences. This being the case, the question arises concerning how the occupied define “betrayal” and execute their sense of morality and justice against those considered as switching allegiance from being their fellow nationals to being considered as outsiders. For this analysis, I investigate the practice of the Korean news media under Japanese colonial rule, developing the concept of verbal caricature. I find that the indigenous media create outrageous verbal images of collaborators: (1) sinners, (2) pawns, and (3) criminals. By exploring the media’s social justice under political constraint, this project contributes to the accumulation of knowledge on the unique practices of deviance-making, prompting a dialog between the two isolated research realms — social deviance and foreign occupation.

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1. Introduction

Foreign invasion creates social disruption and challenge, especially testing the foundation of morality that ties social members in an occupied world. When outside powers gain control over another country, a certain portion of subjugated populations comes forward to operate as the agents of the occupying forces, often undermining the interests of their own community with or

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without intention (Doyle, 1986; Fieldhouse, 1981; Robinson, 1972). From the viewpoint of the subjugated, such collaborative factions pose a serious challenge that betrays the trust and faith of their compatriots with whom they have long shared experiences (see Ben-Yehuda, 2001). This being the case, the question arises concerning how the occupied define “betrayal” and execute their sense of morality and justice against those considered as switching allegiance from their fellow nationals to outsiders.

Scholars studying indigenous collaboration argue that the purge of collaborators arises as a serious social agenda during the post-liberation period (Brook, 2005; Fu, 1993; Treat, 2012; Zanasi, 2008). When the occupying forces are removed, liberated nations usually begin to make those who have aided outside powers feel guilty as traitors, expressing their desires for justice against those perceived as having violated the norms of their community. However, the emergence of defining and purging collaboration primarily after foreign rule may overlook tense relationships between the occupied and those who collaborate at the moment of foreign domination. Indeed, it is a common practice that each community instantly undertakes some sort of policing against enemies from within, be they formal or informal (see Brubaker and Laitin, 1998).

Studies on social deviance have examined the formation of communal boundaries under drastic social changes; in particular, the news media have played a crucial role in establishing a series of categories that define deviance, contrasting them to valid and meaningful norms (Altheide, 1997, 2002; Cohen, 2002; Erikson, [1966], 2005; Frailing and Harper, 2010; Glassner, 1999; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009; Lauderdale and Estep, 2011). In the face of turmoil that utterly shakes the principles of the social world, the news media create cultural and political categories that establish the boundaries of values, beliefs, and social identities. Based on their moral stances and what they see as focal issues, the media inform the public of emergent threats that require immediate attention, further determining what they deliver to audiences and how they shape “what the population sees, hears, and reads” (Lauderdale and Estep, 2011, p.73).

In most studies, however, the news media has substantial latitude in delineating which deeds are acceptable; little research has shown how news organizations create the categories of deviance when their operational capacities are greatly restricted. Foreign occupation produces a structural constraint in which it is difficult for the occupied to not only challenge the foreign rule, but also openly police their “traitorous” fellow nationals. Given such challenging circumstances, the indigenous media has considerable limitations in defining who disqualifies as a community member. It is worth investigating how the media under the control of foreign occupiers characterize those who work for foreign occupiers as deviant.

In this spirit, I investigate Korean newspapers’ attempts to create the categories of deviance during the Japanese colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945. Scholars have identified the roles of the indigenous media as operating either in opposition to or in support for Japan’s colonial policies (Caprio, 2003, 2011; Kim, 2000; Robinson, 1984; cf. Hwang, 2007; see section “Korean references”: Hwang, 2009b; Kim, H.-u., 2012a; Lee, H.-u., 2010a; Park, H.-H., 2005; Park, Y.-G., 2009b, 2012; Yoon, 2011, 2012). Yet, there is an empirical void regarding how the Korean nationalistic news media with limited operational capacities treated those who carried out ruling plans on behalf of outsiders in different punitive manners.

Moreover, scholars have meticulously excavated historical anecdotes that reveal immorality or (un)acceptable behaviors of those who collaborated with the Japanese colonial power, making their own scholarly judgments on those who worked for the occupying forces (Wells, 1988; Moon, 2013; Treat, 2012; see section “Korean references”: Chōng, 2003; Hwang, 2012;

Im, 1991, 2005; Kim et al., 1990; Kim, Y.-h., 2011; Yi, 1911).¹ Separate from the evaluations on the controversial behavior, I analyze the news media's struggles to disapprove of a critical mass of members whom they perceived as abnormal and impose serious normative pressures and regulations on the members.

This project prompts a dialog between the two isolated research realms – social deviance and foreign occupation. Studies of deviance under-examined the roles of the news media as deviance-creating agents within the limit of their operational capacities. Meanwhile, scholars studying foreign control overlooked how subjugated nations create and enact certain forms of sanction against disloyal in-group members perceived as neglecting the collective interests of their community. By supplementing underlying assumptions of each realm, as well as filling its empirical hole as discussed above, this project contributes to the accumulation of knowledge on the unique practices of deviance-creating under challenging social contexts.

Ultimately, I uncover social processes in which news organizations sort out the behaviors that deviate from communal standards into the categories of deviance under foreign domination. I begin by laying out the theoretical framework of deviance-creation (i.e., caricature) as a particular genre of society's reaction to collaboration under foreign rule. To this end, I examine the procedures through which the news media administer the interpretation and definition of collaboration, as well as specific conditions under which diverse campaigns for social justice against traitorous behaviors arise. After explaining this study's data and methods, I turn to the various practices of caricature by which Korean newspapers expressed their apprehensions concerning "traitorous" behaviors and, in turn, responded to such behaviors.

2. A theoretical framework: caricaturing traitors

To examine the deviance-creating practices of the indigenous media under Japanese colonial rule, I build a theoretical framework for analyzing the conditions and procedures of portraying salient images of traitorous community members. To this end, I draw on studies of graphic caricature, as well as of frame analysis in social movements and communications, focusing on the inventive ways in which the news media produce the coverage on those who support an occupying power.

2.1. *Traitors and caricature*

The subjugated nations aspire to deter those who aid outsiders and disrupt the operating ground of their traitorous behaviors (see Chung, 2002, Pp. 26–30).² As discussed earlier, however, foreign occupation creates a structural predicament in which active and logical exhortations for communal justice and responsibility are difficult for indigenous societies to express. Subjected nations lack official ground that allows for reasonable and overt appeals to mitigate injustices committed by collaborative factions, as well as by the occupying forces (Doyle, 1986; Brook, 2005). Faced with violence and dehumanization of foreign occupiers and their collaborators, the subjugated should at least be able to find a way to keep their dignity unless they have enough power to overcome the occupying forces.

¹It requires a separate attention to examine a particular social and historical context in which the issue of collaboration transpired in postcolonial Korea.

²What collaboration implies differs from one community to another; further, the occupied nations' understandings of collaboration are distinguished from those of scholars.

This being the case, the indigenous media move toward formulating tortuous but viable methods of dealing with questionable behaviors. Studies of graphic caricature examine how the news media illustrate exaggeration or distortion of someone to make political and moral judgments on the person (Hampton, 2009; Hess and Northrop, 2011; Kerr, 2000; Lamb, 2004; Lordan, 2006; McWilliams, 2010; Navasky, 2013; Streicher, 1965). Caricatures expose concealed and disgraceful attributes of the individuals while conveying provocative messages meant to insult, criticize, and control by deliberately transforming characteristics of the actors into simplified, ludicrous communal portraits (cf. Coupe, 1969, p. 88). Overall, caricatures serve to instigate and perpetuate public (dis)agreements on their subjects, including politicians, with contentious reputations and marginalized ethnic groups.

By adopting the concept of graphic caricatures, I argue that as an effort to maintain internal conformity and resist external control, (verbal) *caricature* arises as a special genre of community's reactions to collaboration. When possible, the indigenous news media attempt to produce outrageous verbal images of the operations of collaborators for purposes of punishment. Put differently, caricature is an interpretive deviance-creating practice in which the occupied endow traitorous members with such derogatory images as being pathetic, immoral, and condemnable by disclosing the factors that lead to the erosion of the bonds that bring members together. Despite its verbal nature, the existence of the occupying forces renders caricature into being less concerned with logical arguments that thoroughly criticize collaboration than with nuanced and somewhat ambiguous forms of criticism of the behavior.³

2.2. *Conditions of caricature*

The subjects of caricature are selectively identified. What the problematic behaviors are, whether to regulate them, and how to characterize them, are exposed to the perceptions of those who generate social deviance; yet, there are certain conditions in which collaboration becomes a focus of the media's consideration and interpretation. Studies on deviance have identified key factors that result in community's responses to problematic behaviors (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1951; Scheff, 1966). People are likely to define certain behaviors as deviant when they clearly and frequently observe those behaviors and when they identify the viciousness of the behaviors as well as the seriousness of their actual or anticipated consequences (cf. Tepper, 2009). In addition, social distance between members, combined with their social attributes such as status, age, gender, and race, contribute to the rise of deviance-creating. These factors are concerned with not only the act of rule-violation, per se, but also the power relations that surround it (Lauderdale, 2011; Pfohl, 2009).

Similarly, collaborators can attract the attention of the news media based broadly on two contributing factors: (1) the degree of foreign control, and (2) the salience of collaboration. Above all, the coverage of the media aiming to oppose foreign control and its collaborators are highly influenced by the tightness of foreign rule. That is, depending on their relative independence from the influence of the occupying forces, the indigenous media is able to convey a different tone and gestures toward those they perceived as betraying their own community. For example, the media under the thumb of occupiers have to resort to more covert ways of attacking while those not directly regulated can be free to attack those considered traitors.

³While graphic caricature sometimes expresses approval of those who draw public attention, verbal caricature under foreign control is an expression of how traitors become conspicuous objects of public disapproval. Further, the practice of visual caricatures as a particular artistic genre was rare in Japanese-occupied Korea.

Moreover, the indigenous media pay particular attention to the salience of collaborative behaviors combined with their harmful consequences on the occupied. That is, the presentation of negative images of collaboration is likely to arise when behaviors that (1) break membership to the community, (2) hurt the pride and honor of the indigenous community, or (3) inflict serious damage on the wellbeing of fellow nationals are repeatedly and noticeably observed (see [Ben-Yehuda, 2001](#)). Collaborators may be merely following the orders of the nonnative ruler against their will; the subjugated still believe that they should be held responsible for the detrimental consequences of their behaviors on the obligation, integrity, safety of their own people (cf. [Garland, 2001](#)). Such behaviors disturb the existing norms and beliefs of the occupied societies; when these behaviors become frequent and conspicuous, the media must mark those who commit them as the objects of condemnation and punishment.

2.3. Procedures of caricature

After identifying focal subjects of verbal assaults, the news media administer caricature. Studies of frame analysis have extensively examined the rise and consequences of framing devices utilized by the news media ([Entman, 1993](#); [Gamson et al., 1992](#); [Johnson-Cartee, 2005](#); [Norris et al., 2003](#); [Tannen, 1993](#)). Through evocative ideas and language, the media is capable of rendering episodic events or general social problems, thus shaping the experiences of target populations, as well as public interest. Separate from concerns about partial or distorted understanding of reality that framing may present, the underlying messages of the studies provide useful insights into exploring the ways in which the indigenous media locate focal information on collaborators in a deliberately chosen context that asserts deviation from social standards.

Drawing on the studies of frame analysis, I lay out several constituent practices of caricature that yield vernacular images of traitors: (1) indexing, (2) alteration, and (3) amplification. Above all, caricature begins with an indexing process that serves to extract a set of cultural clues that stipulate offensive meanings comprehensible to the audience in a given social space. Verbal images generated via caricature are interpreted within the bounds of a cultural sphere that primarily residents fully understand; thus, this indexing process is concerned with referring to cultural remarks that signify knowledge structures composed of community members' common experiences and memory (see [McAdam et al., 1996](#); [Snow et al., 1986](#); [Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992](#)). Considering that the occupied attempt to convert collaboration into a disreputable image, indexing exploits a pool of idioms and symbols that appear less frequently in everyday communications and that confer the greatest humiliation and pejoratives on the behavior (see [Tannenbaum, 1963](#)).

The next phase of caricature involves the alteration of focal actors into remarkable and memorable characters (see [Hess and Northrop, 2011](#); [Kerr, 2000](#); [Lamb, 2004](#); [Lordan, 2006](#); [McWilliams, 2010](#); [Navasky, 2013](#)). That is, those against whom a given community's accusation is directed are transformed into a corrupt but succinct illustration of deviance. In this sense, caricature is not merely a descriptive practice, but a bold simplification of objects. By means of alteration, the features and behaviors of focal actors are inflated or distorted to some extent – but not fabricated – so that they hold undeniably negative characteristics. Moreover, rather than being explored in every detail, focal behaviors are reduced into a less complicated form so as to stand out as recognizable images to others ([Edwards, 1998](#)).

As a representative practice of alteration, studies on deviance have examined the ways in which demonic images embedded in the worldview of a given community are assigned to troubling behaviors (Ben-Yehuda, 1985; Chermak, 2002; Cohen, 2002; Erikson, [1966], 2005; Frailing and Harper, 2010; Pfohl, 2009). Demonic perspective has played a powerful role in shaping perceptions and definitions of deviance. Relying on this perspective, communal members explain that “otherworldly” entities such as devils and Satan cause deviance through “temptation” or “possession” of individuals and groups (Pfohl, 2009, pp. 19–58). In addition, a certain portion of communal members is designated as witches whose behaviors — usually without reasonable grounds — are perceived as causing harmful consequences and thus must be deterred. By associating certain members with supernatural entities, each community sends out messages that increase fear and danger among the public and simultaneously gain control over their targets as well as the rest of the community.

Lastly, the effectiveness of caricature can be achieved through an amplification process in which the media load moral judgment and gushing emotions onto troubling behaviors (see Benford and Snow 2000, Pp. 623–625; Snow and Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986; see also Goodwin et al., 2001). For example, layering righteous outrage onto collaborators in caricature helps to invoke complaints and concerns that underlie the conscientiousness of the occupied. In other words, by crafting the behavior in an all the more morally charged inclination, the media reinforce public consent against a menace seen as disturbing core communal values and identities (cf. Cohen, 2002). Then caricature may depict the behaviors of collaborators as being more harmful than that of their actual state; however, with the insertion of emotions into a given scene, caricature can successfully accomplish its overarching project of turning the behaviors into deviance (see Kerr, 2000; Streicher, 1965).

The instigation of public sentiment in the amplification phase can be further fulfilled by synthesizing the reactions of audiences in a given scene (see Edwards, 1998). Incorporating audiences as reactors to troubling behaviors is a crucial element because it serves to point out the contrast between normal, acceptable values and the deviant behavior of collaborators, thereby undermining collaborators’ reputation and competency. In this manner, caricature serves to make salient a normative line between traitors and the rest of the occupied. In what follows, I explain the data and methods used to examine the ways in which Korean newspapers produced verbal caricatures of their “treacherous” peers.

3. Data and methods

To investigate the media’s verbal caricature of collaborators in Japanese-occupied Korea, I rely on newspaper articles published at the time of occupation, which I obtained from 1) “The History of Korean Independence Movement Online,” 2) “National Institute of Korean History – DB,” and 3) “MEDIAGAON.” These three sources are digital archives that provide access to various types of the news media since the late nineteenth century. I have excluded newspapers written in Chinese and Japanese to focus on ones that provide relatively ample information concerning collaborative Koreans: *Taehan Maeil Sinbo*, *Sinhan Minbo*, *Tongnip Sinmun*, *Sidae Ilbo*, and *Tonga Ilbo*.

The main purpose of this project is to analyze how indigenous newspapers criminalize those who side with foreign occupiers and define them as “traitors” of their own community, suggesting the following research design. Above all, I traced newspaper articles by using searching terms pertaining to collaboration in Korean such as *ch’inil*, and *puil*. Then, I expanded the search by including terms with particularly offensive cultural meanings such as

Table 1
The media coverage of collaboration in Japanese-occupied Korea.

Newspapers	The numbers of media coverage		
	Group A	Group B	Group C
	1909–1910	1925	1920–1921
<i>Taehan Maeil Sinbo</i> 1904–1910	63 (517)	–	–
<i>Sidae Ilbo</i> 1923–1926	–	24 (51)	–
<i>Sinhan Minbo</i> 1909–1945	23 (104)	0 (0)	16 (50)
<i>Tongnip Sinmun</i> 1919–1943	–	–	28 (175)
<i>Tonga Ilbo</i> 1920–1962	–	13 (64)	11 (40)

Note: Group A includes those who were perceived as welcoming the Japanese invasion around 1910, Group B as spreading Japan's native policies in the 1920s and Group C as harming their compatriots in the 1920s; I provided the number of articles under examination, the ones that described serious Koreans' reactions to collaborators in great detail, as well as the number of articles identified with searching terms pertaining to collaboration in parentheses.

maeguk, *pyŏnjŏl*, *apchabi*, *paesin*, *waegyŏn*, *chugu*, *magwi*, etc.⁴ I focused on newspaper editorials, criticism, and columns that expressed disapproving ideas about those who worked for Japan.

By selecting only the media's adversarial reactions, this project overlooks entire incidents of collaboration including those that refer to subtle, nuanced (and invisible) behaviors that aided Japan. Yet, nationally biased contents still capture crucial information on the viewpoints of those who struggled against foreign domination. Given my research emphasis on the roles of the indigenous media as social justice agencies, negative portrayals of collaboration in the news coverage allow for exploring how the indigenous media depict behaviors that seemingly break social standards of occupied Korea as disturbing and problematic.

After the initial search on a wide variety of collaborative actions, I confined my analysis to those cases that provided more frequent and fuller descriptions of the media's reactions.⁵ This step allowed me to identify three different groups of collaborators in a particular historical moment. That is, I focused on collaborators who were perceived as: (1) welcoming the Japanese invasion around 1910, (2) advancing Japan's native policies under its control in 1925, and (3) inflicting bitterness and harm on Koreans between 1920 and 1921. By looking at the three cases that triggered the reaction of newspapers, it is possible to understand which behaviors were defined as deviant in the occupied society.⁶ Newspaper articles under examination were generally based on facts; however, again, reporters, editors, and contributors processed, converted, and presented the images of collaborators in politically influential ways.

⁴For additional information on Koreans' overall attitudes toward collaboration, I have also consulted historical sources, such as the public data compiled by the Korean government (i.e., Ch'inilpanminjokhaengwikwan'gyesaryojip) and the biographical encyclopedia of pro-Japanese collaborators published by the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities (i.e., Ch'inilinmyongsajon).

⁵I acknowledge that this selection process is still subject to a researcher's discretion and subjectivity.

⁶Further note that the media reports of each case were identified outside a given period and that there were many other cases perceived as a serious social challenge in a given period.

Moreover, Japanese authorities frequently disturbed the operations of Korean newspapers as sanctioning enterprises (see section “Korean references”: Park, S.-h., 2011; Yoon, 2012).⁷ Subsequently, the state of actual collaboration throughout the occupation does not necessarily correspond to the media’s identification of the behavior. Once again, my analysis is limited to certain social contexts for which critical reports on collaboration are available. Table 1 summarizes the number of the media coverage analyzed in this project, as well as the number of articles after the initial search in parentheses.⁸

I have interpreted newspaper articles, focusing on the evaluations of reporters, editors, and contributors and paying close attention to their tone and diction. I have translated into English all articles under examination and provided direct links to each article presented. Above all, I analyzed terminologies that the news media pulled out of the indigenous culture to define the identities and behaviors of collaborators. Simultaneously, I scrutinized the stereotypical fashion by which collaborators were transformed into a threat to normative community criteria, particularly by the media’s identifying the collaborators through demonic perspectives. I assessed unmitigated and emotionally loaded statements by the news media as well. In the frequent scenes of collaboration presented by the media, I paid attention to the media’s depiction of average Koreans’ eagerness to stand up to collaborative factions.⁹

It should be noted that this project does not intend to generalize the *rise* of sanctioning practices associated with a particular type of collaborative behaviors by considering a sizable number of newspaper articles produced at a given time. Rather, I present the media’s distinctive interpretive practices in which those who aid the external ruler lose their legitimate space of action in the occupied world (cf. Lauderdale and Estep, 2011). By doing so, the features of caricature provided in this analysis may not be applicable to other questionable behaviors that the news media aspire to denounce. While acknowledging this limitation, I examine in detail the contents of the coverage of nationalistic newspapers, as well as the conditions of caricature in Japanese-occupied Korea. I now turn to the various ways the media evaluated and interpreted collaborators based on the moral standards of the occupied society.

4. Findings

Caricature manifests itself in various forms based on the media’s judgment and evaluation of different aspects of collaboration.¹⁰ I identify three forms of caricature that turn collaborators into outrageous and scurrilous images of deviance: (1) sinners¹¹ (transgressors of taken-for-granted rules of their community), (2) pawns (instruments of outsiders), and (3) criminals¹² (unforgivable evildoers, whose lives deserve to be denied).

⁷For instance, newspapers’ negative reactions to collaboration were virtually silent during the 1930s and 1940s due to immense pressures in wartime society. Koreans still expressed their uncomfortable feelings about collaborators during this period, but the operational capacities of newspapers were extremely restricted by the Japanese authorities.

⁸Some newspaper articles under examination are also identified in the government data mentioned in footnote 4.

⁹These analytic components often overlapped one another in a given article.

¹⁰Further note that the examples under examination can be interpreted in other ways.

¹¹Sin often belongs to the theological realm in the Western world; in this project, I relate the concept to moral failures or misdeeds.

¹²The concept of crime overlaps with that of sin to some extent; however, the former pertains to a judicial category while the latter is associated with the realm of morality.

4.1. Making sinners

In the late 19th century, the Meiji government of Japan competed with Western colonial powers for territorial and economic expansion. In particular, Japan planned to incorporate Korea to counter the political and militaristic expansion of China and Russia there, which threatened its national security and interests (Dudden, 2005; Duus, 1995; Lew, 1985). Japan achieved victories in military wrangling with the two countries (via the First Sino-Japan War in 1895 and the Russo-Japan War in 1905). It then took the dominant position of control over Korean domestic politics and took several legal steps to take over the Korean peninsula. On 17 November 1905, Japan concluded an agreement with the Korean government, the Ulsa Treaty, under which Japan placed Korea under its protectorate and established the Residency-General of Korea in Seoul.

For some Koreans, it was obvious that Japan would soon become Korea's master. At the time of the 1905 Treaty, Korean government officials and the central and local *Yangban* (Korean noblemen) formed a number of political organizations that contributed to facilitating Japan's invasion of Korea. Among others, the activities of *Ilchinhoe* were the most extensive and noticeable (Lone, 1988; Moon, 2013; see section "Korean references": Han, 2001). Under President Yi, Yong-gu and the head of the backbench, Song, Pyong-jun, *Ilchinhoe* asserted that the annexation of the "weak and corrupt" Korean government to Japan was inevitable. They openly supported the conclusion of the Ulsa Treaty and another treaty in 1907 placing Japan in charge of Korea's diplomacy and facilitating Japan's interference with Korean domestic affairs. In turn, Japan provided *Ilchinhoe* with prodigious operating funds (see section "Korean references": Cho, 1988).

Most notably, *Ilchinhoe* made official requests that articulated support for Japan's incorporation of Korea (Moon, 2013; see section "Korean references": Han, 2001; Kim, J.-J., 2011, 2012; Lee, T.-H., 2010c, 2012). On 4 December 1909, President Yi, Yong-gu sent the Korean and Japanese governments the "Petitions of Korea-Japan Annexation," which urged the Korean government to surrender its sovereignty to Japan, since it had insufficient power to protect its people and territory; in turn, Japan should guarantee Korea's autonomous position as a federal member of Japan. These letters further noted that even if absorbed by Japan, Korea would still join Japan in advancing the prosperity of the two nations and contributing to the peace and order of East Asia. In support of President Yi, several Confucian scholars, including So, Ch'ang-bo, Yang, Chae-sung, and Yu, Ch'i-yong, also jointly sent a follow-up letter to the Resident-General of Korea, Sone, Arasuke on 17 December 1909.

Based on such open political campaigns in favor of Japan, members of *Ilchinhoe* were severely denounced by Koreans and became frequent targets of attacks by the Korean nationalist camp. In particular, nationalistic newspapers such as *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* and *Sinhan Minbo* reported *Ilchinhoe*'s frequent meetings and criticized its political goals, which included asking Japan to absorb their own country (see section "Korean references": Kim, J.-J., 2012b; cf. Park, Y.-G., 2012). The media kept watch on collaborators' movements and requested that they refrain from their "wrongdoing."

Above all, newspapers produced articles that depicted *Ilchinhoe*'s core members as sub-humans who grotesquely deviated from ordinary and moral figures. They were particularly intolerant of Song, Pyong-jun and Yi, Yong-gu, who were perceived as serving their own interests regardless of the destiny of the country. In editorials, Song and Yi were often called demons that were getting fat on the calamities of their community. Further, newspapers described how Song and Yi's malicious influence dragged numerous ignorant followers into a

den of vice. On 5 December 1909,¹³ *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* exemplified such an attempt to criticize members of *Ilchinhoe* by describing immoral deeds of those collaborative factions, creating vivid images:

Alas, you *Ilchinhoe*!...you are producing such an outrageous statement [i.e., the petitions]...what do ignorant followers [of *Ilchinhoe*] know? They were simply made puppets of the heads such as Song, Pyong-jun and Yi, Yong-gu without even knowing that they are played by the head devils and that their deeds send the country to doom. Alas, you *Ilchinhoe*! Song and Yi do not care whether their country turns into total chaos or whether their dear 20 million fellow Koreans are completely trampled underfoot as long as they satisfy only their own appetite...to my bitter regret, a group of 400,000 followers, without thinking, betrays their own country, being possessed with [those] demons.

The tone of argument is somewhat sympathetic to those simple followers, distinguishing them from the prime movers, Song and Yi. According to the article, the “head devils,” Song and Yi, manipulated these followers, who remained ignorant of what they had done to their nation. The article urges them to awaken from the malevolent spells of Song and Yi before it is too late. At the same time, it indirectly offers hope that these simple followers can make room for betterment by returning to the nation’s side.

The media widely distributed succinct but defamatory portrayals of collaborators through labels epitomizing those actors as greedy demons; such transformation was coordinated with the cultural element in Eastern culture. In addition to attacking *Ilchinhoe* members, newspapers frequently reported meetings of Confucian scholars who sent supporting letters to the Korean and Japanese governments. The media called them *agwi*, which means the Pretas, or hungry ghosts. In Buddhism, greedy and jealous people, after death, end up falling into one of six hells where they live as hungry ghosts of bizarre shape. Because of their karma, whenever they try to reach food, it turns into fire. In an article on 27 January 1910, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* stated, “the members of [collaborative] groups sold their country and nation in order to eat their fill. Alas, given their crimes, it is appropriate for them to be sent to the hell where *agwi* lives” (p. 1).¹⁴ Similar expressions appeared in headlines in this newspaper in 1910 to draw attention to collaborators’ dubious morality: “*Agwi* Flocking Together” (28 January, p. 2),¹⁵ “*Agwi* Getting into Mischief Again” (8 February, p. 2),¹⁶ and “*Agwi* Dying of Hunger” (6 March, p. 1).¹⁷ In variations on the story of *agwi* in other Asian countries (e.g., India, China, and Japan), the tale commonly conveys a moral message that avarice is a repugnant or demeaning characteristic for communal members.

Newspapers’ caricature of collaborators as sinners was further bolstered by incorporating the violent reactions of Koreans and a tone of judgment. Newspapers particularly focused on Koreans’ physical assaults on So, Ch’ang-bo, a leading collaborative Confucian scholar. In an article entitled “Why Did You Send Letters?”, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* stated that “after submitting letters to the Korean Cabinet and Japan’s Residency-General of Korea, So, Ch’ang-bo and his family have been living in a disturbance because of stone-throwing [from other Koreans] every

¹³http://gonevs.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19091205u00_01.pdf.

¹⁴http://gonevs.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19100127u00_01.pdf.

¹⁵http://gonevs.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19100128u00_02.pdf.

¹⁶http://gonevs.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19100208u00_02.pdf.

¹⁷http://gonevs.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19100306u00_01.pdf.

night” (24 December 1909, p. 2).¹⁸ On the next day, the newspaper reported that “four to five people severely beat So, Ch’ang-bo,” at So’s home (25 December 1909, p. 1).¹⁹ Further, an article about another physical assault on So on 28 December 1909,²⁰ was sarcastically stated “Blessed with Beating” (p. 2). So did not die, but his life was difficult. Newspapers tended to take Koreans’ punishment of So for granted. At the same time, they distributed a message that justified fellow Koreans’ challenge and punishment of the immoral communal member. In other words, by depicting eager audiences intolerant of collaborators, the media reversed the direction of control from collaborators to moral communal members.

Newspapers delivered “the facts” about what happened to So to some extent; however, they further drove him into grave misery. On 1 February 1910, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* remarked, “as So, Ch’ang-bo was walking on the street...people pointed at So and chattered that he was the one who got beaten. Then, So walked away without a backward glance and hid himself like a rat” (p. 2).²¹ This article indicates that Koreans’ anger against So was strong and widespread, and that So seriously suffered from the negativity of his compatriots. In addition, it describes So as a rat who quickly senses the danger of being beaten again as he overhears the gossip. This description of So’s dodging a beating amplifies the fate of the sinner. As such, by reporting on collaborators’ everyday lives in detail with mocking comments, the newspaper fostered an atmosphere in which “betrayers” of the nation were losing moral ground among their own people.

In response to those who actively accepted the invasion of outsiders, the media assigned negative images, turning them into serious moral defectors. In the absence of protection by its own government, the media were particularly nationalistic in an attempt to provide a counterbalance to the norms and morality of their community. Through the caricature of collaborators as sinners, newspapers alerted the community to what behaviors would be acceptable under foreign control. However, when Japan officially incorporated Korea on 29 August 1910, the national media came under the control of the Japanese authority. Japan almost entirely restricted freedom of speech in Korea, shutting down the presses or turning them into its organs. Newspapers (especially *Taehan Maeil Sinbo*) subsequently produced arguments that were pro-Japanese in tone, supporting the occupiers’ ruling projects (see section “Korean references”: Kim, H.-u., 2012a; Park, H.-H., 2005). The operation of the media went on hiatus until other newspapers were established in the 1920s.

4.2. Making pawns

Unlike its oppressive rule in the early phase of its occupation of Korea, Japan changed its ruling policies in the 1920s, allowing Koreans to have some freedom of speech, association, and religion (Caprio, 2011; Robinson, 1984).²² During this period, the Japanese authority started to use political organizations to advertise its ruling projects. Relying on the aid of such indigenous groups, Japan intended to understand the drift of public sentiment, as well as to garner Koreans’ cooperation in building its empire (Devine, 1997). Further, private newspapers, including *Tonga Ilbo* and *Sidae Ilbo* were established for the first time during Japanese rule. Japan enforced censorship on these newspapers. Nevertheless, the Korean media were able to express limited

¹⁸http://gonews.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19091224u00_02.pdf.

¹⁹http://gonews.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19091225u00_01.pdf.

²⁰http://gonews.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19091228u00_02.pdf.

²¹http://gonews.kinds.or.kr/OLD_NEWS_IMG3/DMD/DMD19100201u00_02.pdf.

²²This change occurred due to Koreans’ massive resistance against Japan in 1919.

criticism of national matters (Caprio, 2003; see section “Korean references”: Park, Y.-G., 2009b; Yoon, 2011).

During this period, the prominent activities of a political group called *Siguk Taedongdan* (hereafter *Taedongdan*) evoked strong antagonism from fellow Koreans (see section “Korean references”: Kim, 2001; An, 2012). This organization was anchored in the largest aboriginal religious group in Korea, *Poch'on'gyo*. Its leader, Ch'a, Kyong-sok, claimed to be a son of Heaven who would unify the entire world and bring happiness to Koreans. In 1922, he started preaching in Seoul; his lay devotees reached almost 6 million. Given the enormous expansion of Ch'a, Kyong-sok's congregation, the Japanese authority kept a close watch on this religion and regulated its activities. To ensure their freedom, executive members of the religion lobbied the Japanese government. Japan permitted the religion on the condition that *Poch'ongyo* propagate Japan's new ruling ideology, “the harmonization between Koreans and Japanese” in league with another Korean political group, Kakp'a Yuji Yonmaeng (see section “Korean references”: Kim, 2001; Kim, 2007; An, 1998 for *Poch'on'gyo*'s nationalistic movements).

Under the influence of the Japanese authority, *Taedongdan* was launched on 9 January 1925. The principal promoters of this organization, including Im, Kyong-ho and Ch'ae, Ki-du, announced overarching guidelines: “to strengthen the mental unification of Koreans and Japanese” and “to present a united front to advance culture in Korea.” Then, under the flagship of *Taedongdan*, eight groups of speakers made lecture tours across the country in January 1925 to publicize Japan's ruling policies. Nationalistic newspapers frequently reported the tours in detail as well as reactions to the speakers.

Above all, the media actively transformed the speakers into instruments of the foreign ruler by characterizing them in a mocking tone as hollow entities. Newspapers severely criticized these lecturers for having forgotten their sense of kinship. They depicted the collaborators as not even knowing the significant meanings of their origin and as having simply been swayed by the outsiders' control. On 16 January 1925, an article in *Sidae Ilbo* about a lecture in the city of *Taegu* captures the media's satiric description of the speakers:

...It seems that grandfathers and fathers of several lecturing creatures are not Koreans but Japs; if they were Koreans, born and would die in Korea, they would not hope for the demise of their country; those creatures are making a fuss, arguing that Koreans should be integrated into the Japanese people...

In this article, the ethnic slur, “Japs” is used, indicating the hard feelings of the news media against the occupiers. At the same time, by equating the lecturers to their lowly foreign counterparts, the article turns those speakers into objects of derision. Moreover, the lecturers are belittled as “creatures.” Unconscious of where they belong, the article asserts, they make only useless bustle, lacking the capacity for independent decision.

More importantly, the speakers' spinelessness and susceptibility to manipulation are highlighted in the article's focus on the characteristics of the lecture participants. The article claims that a large number of attendees are local devotees of *Poch'on'gyo*. In reality, according to newspapers published during the period, a majority of the lecture audiences (approximately two hundred to four hundred at each session) were merely filling seats, regardless of the subject of the talk or their political beliefs for the purpose of supporting the speakers, who were also executive members of their religion.

It was incomprehensible why there were so many people in such a lecture, but it turned out to be that those attendees were just a bunch of fish-headed and demon-faced *tokkaebi*;

the most splendid scene was that some were nodding off but suddenly waking up and clapping their hands upon hearing others' applaud without knowing what went on (16 January 1925, p. 2).²³

In this scene, those devotees were defined as objects of amusement and ridicule, descriptions grounded in cultural components of Korean society. Attendees were depicted as demons (i.e., *tokkaebi*, a Korean version of goblin); by comparing attendees to *tokkaebi*, the article sought to highlight the ugliness and silliness of the participants. Moreover, devotees who dozed off and were startled into waking were singled out by the newspaper to highlight their stupidity. Ultimately, the newspaper rendered the lecture a nonsensical show by comparing devotees and their strikingly dumb behavior to the grotesque image of goblins (fish-headed and demon-faced). In this manner, newspapers created the ludicrous images of collaboration, attempting to weaken the movement of the "traitorous" communal members.

The media strengthened the images of collaborators as acquiescent tools of the Japanese authority by magnifying collaborators' incompetency and helplessness; to this end, they combined Koreans' violent reactions against collaborators with the idea of justice and righteousness. Newspapers frequently reported that Koreans had severely paralyzed the activities of collaborators through aggressive reactions during the lecture tours. For instance, *Sidae Ilbo* (15 January 1925, p. 1)²⁴ addressed a *Taedongdan* lecture on 10 January in the city of *Taegu*. After the speech, *Taedongdan* speakers were heading to the station at night to move to the city of *Chonju* for another meeting. According to the article, one of the speakers, Ch'ae, Ki-du, was passing the ticket gate at the station; at that moment, An, Tal-duk, a young Korean, hit Chae, who fell to the ground. The article described An's attack:

When Mr. An, Tal-duk knocked Ch'ae down, a ticket examiner [seemed to] lose his senses, and hundreds of the crowd [i.e., *Poch'on'gyo* devotees] had their hearts in their mouths and became cream-faced. Station employees also stood frozen to the spot, thinking that probably Mr. An was a robber. Mr. An shouted in Japanese that 'This rascal sucked the blood of twenty million of the Korean nation and deserved to be killed,' and repeated it in Korean as well. As *Poch'on'gyo* members looked around on pins and needles, Mr. An started to kick around [in the air to threaten the devotees]. Mr. An was said to have escaped with his whole skin from the station and to have returned home.

This article describes most of the crowd at the station as going white with terror due to An's radical action against Ch'ae; more importantly, the actions of An and the devotees are sharply contrasted. An is depicted as a man of dauntless courage and even as untouchable despite the large number of devotees at the station. By contrast, the devotees are seen as acting helpless in the face of the righteous anger of one man, who thwarts unacceptable behaviors. By means of such contrasts, the timidity and weakness of those related to *Taedongdan* and Japan are dramatically emphasized. Further, the article addresses the motives of An's violent attack. According to the article, in Japanese and Korean, he shouted warnings to both the foreign occupiers and their compatriots that anyone who worked mischief against Koreans would be punished. Thus, newspapers described the activities of collaborative factions as being crippled by Koreans' severe sanctions, taking the penalization of the puppet-like collaborators for granted.

²³http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-np_sd_1925_01_16_0590.

²⁴http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-np_sd_1925_01_15_0120.

The key aspect of the caricature of pawns was to transform collaborative members into buffoonish tools of the foreign ruler (see [Streicher, 1965](#)). Rather than focusing on objective and neutral facts, the media insinuated claims of communal justice against traitors while suggesting that Koreans would not be deceived by Japan's political guile. By depicting moments when the public expressed disapproval of *Taedongdan* speakers and their followers and halted the spread of Japan's ruling ideology, nationalistic newspapers indicated to the rest of society the appropriate course of action under foreign control. To judge from these newspaper articles, the activities of *Taedongdan* were brief (confined to January 1925; see section "Korean references": [Kim, 2001](#); [An, 2012](#)). This does not necessarily mean that the organization was dismembered due to the power of the news media, which produced scenes of collaborators' lives. Still, such newspaper caricature created an atmosphere in which Koreans could challenge the activities of the collaborative factions.

4.3. Making criminals

During the 1920s, other groups of Koreans played pivotal roles in carrying out ruling policies and coercive control on behalf of the Japanese authority. Japan gradually consolidated its economic and political system in Korea; accordingly, elite Koreans filled positions as counselors, administrative officials, and law-enforcement agents ([Chae, 2010](#); [Wells, 1988](#); see section "Korean references": [Park et al., 2009](#)). Most notably, certain Koreans working at various positions in the coercive apparatus of Japan informed the Japanese of independent and anti-colonial movements, arrested and tortured Korean rebels, and fought on the front lines against their own compatriots ([Chung, 2002](#); see also [Chen, 1984](#); see section "Korean references": [Lee, S.-E., 2010b](#)). Nationalistic Koreans made these collaborators targets of sanction sooner or later (see section "Korean references": [Chang, 2011](#); [Kim, 2004](#); [Park, H., 2009a](#)).

Due to actual or imputed behaviors that were harmful to the community, these Koreans had an evil reputation among Koreans. One nationalistic newspaper, *Tongnip Sinmun*, vigorously crafted negative images of prominent collaborators. This newspaper was first printed on 21 August 1919, in Shanghai, China, as an organ of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in the spirit of Korea's independence from Japan (see section "Korean references": [Lee, H.-u., 2010a](#); [Kim, 2004](#); see also [Oh, 2011](#); [Wells, 1988](#)). The newspaper reported the movements of the Japanese authority and Korean collaborators beyond the Korean peninsula and sent warning messages to the occupiers and their traitorous communal members.

Due to their association with the Provisional Government, *Tongnip Sinmun* took an extremely aggressive tone against those perceived as having heinous effects on Koreans. In an article on 8 May 1920, the newspaper stated that "a large number of Japs' dogs and *Ch'anggwi* can be found anywhere [around the country]." (p.3).²⁵ *Ch'anggwi* is one of the vilest cultural icons, a ghost which, after dying from a tiger attack, becomes a slave-devil of the tiger and guides it to other human prey. Because of its great nationalistic interest, the newspaper frequently assigned the term to such notorious police officers as Son, U-sun and Kim, Guk-il to emphasize the detrimental behaviors of those collaborators. According to the article, the collaborators supported the enemy, Japan, by arresting patriotic fellow Koreans and "cruelly" torturing fighters of Korean independence movements.

²⁵<https://search.i815.or.kr/ImageViewer/ImageViewer.jsp?tid=ns&id=DR192005080301>.

Such a demonic feature allowed newspapers to imprint the evilness of collaborators in the minds of Koreans around the 1920s.²⁶ Through the incorporation of terms such as *Ch'anggwi* and wild dogs, newspapers highlighted the difficulties Koreans experienced because of “vicious” collaborators and expressed approval of the punishment of notorious collaborators: “The Murder Victim, Kim, Yong-ok, *Ch'anggwi* in the City of *Ui-ju*” (*Sinhan Minbo*, 7 May 1920)²⁷; “A New Organization of Wild Dogs and *Ch'anggwi*” (*Sinhan Minbo*, 8 June 1920).²⁸ The use of these terms for collaborators clearly sent a message that these were malicious traitors in action who should be punished accordingly.

By typifying collaborators as evil and harmful, *Tongnip Sinmun* took more radical steps toward justice against those actors. This newspaper called for the public execution and assassination of dangerous collaborators, denouncing seven types of Koreans’ enemies in an article entitled “Seven Enemies Deserve to Be Killed” on 5 February 1920 (p. 1).²⁹ These targets included: the Japanese, and Korean collaborators who were (1) demagogues, (2) informers, (3) wealthy individuals, (4) officials in the Japanese colonial government, (5) those who impersonated or spoke ill of Korean fighters, and (6) defectors. In this list, the first enemy was the Japanese; however, all other targets were collaborating Koreans. Further, the newspaper provided reasonable explanations for why eliminating collaborative factions was critical, stressing their evilness in unrestrained emotional terms:

We are compelled to indulge ourselves in such inauspicious affairs. Our enemies have persistently done something evil by employing every maneuver and sly deception [toward Koreans]. Those evils are rampant within the country; thus, we concluded that there is no way of stopping such wicked deeds in a peaceful manner. Our enemies have breached our [independent] movements, arresting and outraging our comrades with their tens of thousands of soldiers, police, and *Ch'anggwi* and their thousands of jail cells. We do not have such forces and prisons, but only pistols, daggers, and bombs as a means of restraining those evil kindred. We used to urge our compatriots not to rely on violent measures, but we came to the end of our rope because of the tyranny of the enemies. Whose responsibility is it to make us do this? We gave the enemies chances to correct the serious mistakes that hurt our compatriots numerous times; however, they only ignored our earnest requests...Now only a curse of death will follow them.

According to the article, Korean collaborators had a serious detrimental influence over their compatriots. By becoming subordinates of the primary enemy, Japan, collaborators disrupted Koreans’ efforts toward independence. In addition, they discouraged Koreans’ patriotism and even inflicted harm on compatriots by relying on the enemy’s forces and authorities. The article explains that collaborators were given many chances to stop their misconduct but never listened. Thus, despite the writer’s awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, it was urgent for Koreans to eradicate those “beast-like heinous ones” whose existence had worked vast damage on the community. By calling for Koreans to exact justice, the newspaper challenged the control of the unwanted occupiers as well.

Newspapers in Korea indirectly aided the criminalization of collaborators by reporting on the assassinations of collaborators by nationalist Koreans (see section “Korean references”:

²⁶Newspapers also used this cultural vocabulary around 1910 to describe collaborators’ serious harm to Koreans.

²⁷http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-np_sh_1920_05_07_0190.

²⁸http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-np_sh_1920_06_08_0250.

²⁹<https://search.i815.or.kr/ImageViewer/ImageViewer.jsp?tid=ns&id=DR192002050101>.

Hwang, 2009a,b).³⁰ For example, on 15 August 1920, Yi, Chi-p'yo, a member of a Korean irregular army,³¹ shot and killed Ch'oe, Pyong-hyok, governor of *Unyul County (Tonga Ilbo*, 3 July 1921, p. 3). The same newspaper (25 April 1921, p. 3) described an episode in which a member of another armed group,³² Yi, Ch'ang-dok, killed Kye, Ung-gyu, a governor of *Huch'ang County* in North *P'yongan Province*, on 1 September 1920. It was alleged that these men suppressed fellow Koreans who participated in anti-Japanese and independence movements (the March First Movement in 1919) by relying on the Japanese police. Because of the obstruction of Koreans' desire to regain sovereignty, Korean armed forces sneaked into Korea to attack those local officials during the 1920s. Due to possible recriminations by the Japanese authority on the media, newspapers refrained from making provocative comments. Rather, they sat on the fence, merely reporting that the governors had been shot. Still, the distribution of such information reminded Koreans that evil collaborators held responsibility for what they had done to their own people.

Newspapers' efforts to turn collaborators into objects of termination were supported by the spread of rumors that collaborators were suffering under the fear of violent Korean nationalists. *Tonga Ilbo's* article described the assassination attempts and the threatened state of collaborators:

A hit squad targeted Yi, Chong-guk, a governor of *Talsong County* in North *Kyongsang Province* at night on 2 September 1920. He was able to save his life since he was not home. The hit squad sent a notice of a death sentence to Yi and a distinguished businessman [unknown] in the name of the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Korea on 7 September...As a matter of fact, a rumor was floating around all over the country that some died five or ten days after receiving the notice of the death sentence; the governor and the businessman are said to be hiding somewhere to avoid dangers without free audit (15 September 1920, p. 3).³³

In addition to the notorious local officials described above, Korean armed groups battered wealthy Koreans who subsidized the operations of Japan's military and administration. These wealthy collaborators were considered to be receiving the protection of Japan's forces for the safety of their property while refusing to donate to independence movements in Korea. This article insinuates that once targeted, it was hard for collaborators to escape from those who designed deadly schemes and that collaborators were enveloped by the fear of death. Using reports of revenge, the newspaper created the atmosphere that the use of extreme violence could be justified, especially against those assigned to the category of evilness.

Caricature is different from direct physical attack on collaboration; however, it is closely connected with violent forms of sanction via the process of making criminals. The public perceived collaborators' enormous harm; nationalistic Koreans frequently attempted to stop such harm by permanently excluding traitors from the community. Given the destructive consequences of collaboration on others sharing a common destiny, this request for termination of collaborators was the right thing to do. Similar to sinners and pawns, collaborators were

³⁰As previously discussed, newspapers published within the Korean peninsula under Japan's direct influence (e.g., *Tonga Ilbo*, and *Sidae Ilbo*) provided limited criticism and denouncement against collaborators compared to those outside of the territory (e.g., *Tongnip Sinmun*).

³¹*Taehan Tongnipdan*.

³²*Soro Kunjongso*.

³³http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-np_da_1920_09_15_0600.

demonized under the category of criminals; however, this latter practice of caricature removed forgiveness as an option for collaborators and focused attention on those who did not hesitate to eliminate them. At the same time, by depicting collaborators as criminals, the media sent out seriously threatening messages to other operative collaborative factions outside the focus of the caricature, signaling to the occupied that collaborators would receive what they deserved.

5. Conclusion and discussion

I have demonstrated three distinctive processes in which the indigenous news media produced outrageous and insulting images of collaborators, as well as the existence of immense communal pressure against collaboration at the presence of foreign occupiers. When it came to neglecting communal membership, collaborators were typified as sinners who violated shared moral values and beliefs in the words of newspapers. In response to staining their community's honor, they were personified as pawns who foolishly allowed themselves to be manipulated by outsiders. When perceived as damaging the wellbeing of their community, those on the side of the outsiders were represented as criminals who deserved to be terminated. The media's capacity to impose grave pressure upon those who supported Japan was influenced by the salience and implications of collaborative behaviors and by the tightness of Japanese control.

Broadly speaking, caricature in my analysis is similar to the concept of a frame; yet, it is a tailored analytic concept that particularly considers the operation of the news media within an occupied social setting. Despite variations in its definition, a frame is referred as some sorts of scheme intended to interpret focal figures or social issues in a particular way, reducing them into publicly provoking objects (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 137). Adopting the core idea of frame analysis, I have argued that newspaper organizations in Japanese-occupied Korea mobilized a particular type of frames designed to negatively depict their traitorous community members.

Through this particular genre of social justice, the Korean news media strived to confirm social identities and cohesiveness, as well as to adjust to new social settings by placing collaborators in the categories of deviance (see [Lauderdale, 1976](#)). Upon foreign invasion, the subjugated often find themselves in great confusion and threats. In turn, a certain portion of the subjugated society feel an urgency to protect the due operation and consistency of their community (see also [Erikson, 1966](#)). To this end, they emphasize that threats that violate social order and solidarity exist and attempt to place serious restrictions on these threats. Korean nationalistic newspapers under Japan struggled to establish a new social boundary that represented core societal hopes by reinforcing communal responsibilities and interests against foreign domination.

Obviously, the media's caricature is likely to affect the objects of its verbal assaults, as well as to formulate the responses of its audiences, as many studies of frame analysis and graphic caricatures have shown ([Johnson-Cartee, 2005](#); [McAdam et al., 1996](#); [Snow et al., 1986](#); [Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992](#); see also [Kerr, 2000](#); [Lordan, 2006](#); [McWilliams, 2010](#); [Navasky, 2013](#)). Operating as nationalistic entrepreneurs, Korean newspapers attempted to stir up public opinion and sought to influence the community as much as possible by problematizing collaboration. As a result, radical members of the occupied population could be increasingly motivated to use violent attacks against those who collaborated. Further, depicted as monsters and societal evils, those who aided Japan might have lost their individuality and dignity, and further, felt it difficult to mend tense relationships with their fellow nationals. It requires further investigation concerning the extent to which the news media render the activities and reputations of those who supported an occupying power susceptible to the norms and righteous sentiments of their compatriots.

Nonetheless, caricature is a meaningful social action on the part of the subjugated to enforce their definition of right and wrong and demand the correction of insufferable situations in the imminent presence of foreign domination. That is, caricature, temporarily but incessantly, overturns the direction of control, which typically lies with outsiders and their supporters under foreign control (see [Ewick and Silbey, 2003](#)). The occupied express grudges and complaints against traitorous communal members in everyday life by turning them into the subject of amusement and delegitimation (see [Weeks, 2004](#)). Caricature may not allow the occupied to successfully press those “traitors” to give up their support for the external ruler; however, perhaps more importantly, the practice at least provides an outlet through which the occupied may relieve uncomfortable feelings toward collaborators while making their own lives more bearable under the insufferable circumstances of foreign domination (see [Scott, 1985](#)). Moreover, the practice of caricature may allow the occupied to lessen the bitterness of foreign control while harboring hopes of someday redeeming the right to sovereignty.

The interpretation of the diverse practices of presenting problematic behaviors broadens the implications of social responses to collective crimes or political deviance in existing studies of criminology and deviant behaviors. As I have shown, by depicting collaborators as foolish and ignorant (e.g., as sinners and pawns), caricature is used to deliver a message that people may sometimes make mistakes, and if they stop making problems, they might be forgiven. If collaborators return to the community, the community might take them back. Indeed, deviance-making processes may not entirely shut down tolerance of community members. While the news media create negative images of collaboration, they still leave open the possibility of the community’s reconsideration of problematic behaviors.

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